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This paper provides insight on the economic inefficiency of the classical merit-order dispatch in electricity
markets with uncertain supply. For this, we consider a power system whose operation is driven by a two-stage
electricity market, with a forward and a real-time market. We analyze two different clearing mechanisms:
a conventional one, whereby the forward and the balancing markets are independently cleared following a
merit order, and a stochastic one, whereby both market stages are co-optimized with a view to minimizing
the expected aggregate system operating cost. We first derive analytical formulae to determine the dispatch
rule prompted by the co-optimized two-stage market for a stylized power system with flexible, inflexible and
stochastic power generation and infinite transmission capacity. This exercise sheds light on the conditions for
the stochastic market-clearing mechanism to break the merit order. We then introduce and characterize two
enhanced variants of the conventional two-stage market that result in either price-consistent or cost-efficient
merit-order dispatch solutions, respectively. The first of these variants corresponds to a conventional two-
stage market that allows for virtual bidding, while the second requires that the stochastic power production
be centrally dispatched. Finally, we discuss the practical implications of our analytical results and illustrate
our conclusions through examples.
Key words : Natural resources: Energy, electricity market, renewable energy, merit order, market-clearing
mechanism, uncertainty
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1. Introduction
Electricity markets are typically arranged as sequences of exchanges or pools, where producers
and possibly consumers submit offers and bids specifying the amount of electricity they are willing
to deliver to or withdraw from the network and at what unit price. During the market-clearing
process, a market operator determines the optimal dispatch by accepting a subset of the submitted
offers for electricity production and, possibly, bids for consumption. Furthermore, a market price
or a set of prices, one for each node across the electricity network, is set so that the dispatched
generation and consumption blocks are profitable according to the respective offer and bid prices.
Generally, electricity markets comprise different floors for trading electricity arranged in a sequen-
tial fashion up to the time when electricity is delivered. The presence of a real-time or balancing
market is necessary as electricity is a non-storable commodity, and since imbalances between sup-
ply and offtake result in deviations of the system frequency that can harm machines and appliances
connected to the network. On the other hand, market floors that clear hours ahead of electricity
delivery are also needed to guarantee the participation of units with slower response time, e.g.,
nuclear power plants. Although market structures and regulations vary significantly from country
to country, a common trait is the presence of at least a day-ahead market stage (besides a real-
time one) clearing around noon on the day prior to the delivery of electricity. In many European
countries, day-ahead markets account for the bulk of the total trading of electricity (Weber 2010).
Although other market stages may exist, we consider in the following a two-stage market compris-
ing a forward (day-ahead) and a real-time floor as an abstraction of electricity markets comprising
different market stages.
Traditionally, electricity markets are cleared in a sequential manner and independently from
one another, i.e., without considering the impact of the market-clearing decision on the operation
of future markets stages. In such a conventional arrangement, each market stage is cleared by
dispatching producers and consumers in order according to increasing marginal costs and decreasing
marginal utilities, respectively. Under the assumption that producers and consumers bid their
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“true” marginal costs and benefits, such a dispatch of the forward market based on the merit-order
principle results in schedules that maximize the social welfare exclusively for that market stage.
However, there is no guarantee that it maximizes the total social welfare, i.e., aggregated across
sequential market stages, in the long run. Indeed, the application of the merit-order principle may
leave fast-ramping units out of the forward dispatch and potentially result in a lack of flexibility,
and hence inefficiency, at the real-time stage.
Arguably, the suboptimality of a merit-order based forward dispatch is exacerbated by the
increasing penetration of partly-predictable renewables such as wind and solar. These generation
sources are characterized by a zero (or near-zero) production cost per unit and their dispatch is
often prioritized by market operators. As a result, owners of renewable production facilities submit
price-inelastic forward offers, where a certain quantity, typically a point forecast of future gener-
ation, is offered at zero price (Morales et al. 2014a). In a merit-order based forward dispatch, a
large penetration of renewables may, besides pushing flexible resources out of the market, increase
the need for flexibility at the balancing stage, which results from their uncertain nature.
The attention received by the impact of uncertain renewable generation on electricity markets
has grown in the technical literature along with their actual deployment in power systems. Numer-
ous papers, see for example Jo´nsson et al. (2010), have assessed the downward pressure exercised
by uncertain renewable power on electricity market prices, i.e., the so-called merit-order effect.
Among the most notable consequences of the merit-order effect is the emergence of negative prices,
which are caused by the combination of large volumes of zero-price offers from renewable suppliers
and thermal producers that are willing to incur occasional losses to avoid wear-and-tear of their
units. Hildmann et al. (2014) claims that the removal of feed-in-tariff schemes would partially solve
this problem by inciting owners of renewable generation facilities to internalize forecasting-error
(balancing) costs in their offer, hence resulting in positive marginal costs of renewables. However,
balancing costs are hard to estimate and vary from hour to hour.
Other works have focused on centralized solutions for the coordinated clearing of the forward and
real-time market stages (Pritchard et al. 2010, Morales et al. 2012). In these proposals, the forward
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dispatch is determined by a market operator that makes use of two-stage stochastic programming
to account for the balancing costs due to the uncertain supply and minimize the expected aggregate
system cost. While stochastic dispatch models do not comply with the merit-order at the forward
stage, they guarantee both revenue adequacy for the market operator (Pritchard et al. 2010) and
cost-recovery for the producers (Morales et al. 2012) in expectation. Furthermore, they improve
the long-run social welfare. An alternative solution where the merit-order at the forward market
is only broken for providers of uncertain supply is proposed in Morales et al. (2014b). That work
shows that part of the improvement in expected social welfare achievable by the stochastic dispatch
can be captured by a classical forward market where the dispatch of uncertain renewable generators
is forced by the market operator. In general, though, the problem of determining the optimal
forward offer or dispatch for stochastic power suppliers has no closed form solution in terms of a
simple statistic of the forecast distribution of uncertain supply. Zavala et al. (2015) investigates
stochastic dispatch schemes with ℓ1 and ℓ2 penalization of imbalances where the optimal dispatch
converges to the conditional median and mean of the uncertain supply. However, a generalization of
these properties is not possible, as the underlying penalty assumptions may clash with the offering
preferences of the flexible producers, which ultimately drive the penalization of the imbalances at
the real-time market.
This paper aims to shed light on the impact that preserving the merit order in forward electricity
markets with uncertain supply may have on market efficiency. By market efficiency we mean the
ability of the market to minimize the expected aggregate system operating cost (cost efficiency)
and to deliver a set of prices such that the forward price equals the expectation of the real-time
price (price consistency) — a number of authors have underlined the benefits of price-consistent
market settings (Bessembinder and Lemmon 2002, Kaye et al. 1990, Zavala et al. 2015). For this
purpose, we construct mathematical models for four different types of two-stage markets, namely:
1. A market that is price-consistent and guarantees maximum cost-efficiency. A market with such
properties is achieved by co-optimizing the forward dispatch and the real-time re-dispatch
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through the use of stochastic programming. We show that this market produces, however, dis-
patch solutions that break the merit order. Furthermore, the practical implementation of this
market is not without its challenges and problems in terms of revenue adequacy, cost recovery,
arbitrariness in the probabilistic characterization of the uncertain supply, etc. (Morales et al.
2014b). Therefore, we just use it here as an “ideal” benchmark that theoretically achieves the
highest market efficiency.
2. A market that follows the merit order, but that is, in general, price inconsistent and cost-
inefficient. This is the case of a conventional two-stage market, where the forward and the
real-time settlements are not co-optimized, and where the uncertain supply is systematically
dispatched to a certain statistic of its forecast probability distribution (most commonly, the
conditional expectation).
3. A price-consistent market that preserves the merit order. We construct this market from the
conventional two-stage market described in point 2 above, by introducing a risk-neutral virtual
bidder that arbitrages between the forward and the real-time markets. We show that, in order
to ensure price consistency, such a market may have to give up on cost efficiency.
4. A market that renders the most cost-efficient dispatch among those that respect the merit
order. The practical translation of this market is that of a conventional two-stage market, like
the one described in point 2 above, in which the uncertain supply is centrally dispatched by a
non-profit, all-knowing organization such as an Independent System Operator. We show that,
in order for this market to ensure maximum cost-efficiency, while complying with the merit
order, it may have to give up on price consistency.
Unlike other works that rely on computational simulation for their analysis, e.g.,
Bouffard and Galiana (2008), Khazaei et al. (2014), Morales et al. (2012, 2014b), we derive closed-
form solutions to the mathematical models describing these four types of markets for a stylized
power system with flexible, inflexible and stochastic power generation and infinite transmission
capacity. This exercise allows us to characterize the dispatch solutions prompted by these markets
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and identify conditions for their equivalence or dissimilarity. We accompany this analytical insight
with a meaningful discussion on the practical implications of our results and illustrate our main
conclusions through examples.
The structure of the paper is the following. Sections 2 and 3 deal with markets 1 and 2, respec-
tively. More specifically, we define and formulate the conventional and the stochastic two-stage
electricity markets for a stylized power system and provide the closed forms of the dispatch rules
that each of these markets induce. In these two sections we also introduce some important concepts
that are repeatedly used throughout the paper. In Section 4, we focus on market 3 and provide
conditions under which the conventional and the stochastic market-clearing models are equivalent
in the case that virtual bidding is allowed. Section 5 deals with market 4, that is, with the case of
a conventional two-stage market in which the stochastic power production is centrally dispatched
with the aim of minimizing the expected aggregate system operating cost. The study of this mar-
ket setting allows us to identify conditions under which a conventional two-stage market, even if
price-consistent, does not deliver the most cost-efficient merit-order dispatch. Finally, conclusions
are drawn in Section 6.
2. Conventional or Inefficient Two-stage Market (ConvM)
We first formulate the model of the conventional two-stage market, where the operation of the
forward and the balancing markets is not co-optimized. Each market, therefore, attempts to min-
imize operating costs independently. We describe such a two-stage market as inefficient, because
it results in higher operating costs in the long run.
The market models that we introduce throughout the paper are all tailored to the stylized power
system described below.
Definition 1 (Stylized power system). Our stylized power system has infinite transmission
capacity and consists of inflexible, flexible and stochastic power generation technologies with capac-
ities pI > 0, pF > 0, and pW > 0, in that order. We denote the marginal cost of the flexible and
inflexible generating capacity by cF > 0 and cI > 0, respectively, and assume that the marginal
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cost of the stochastic power production is zero. Furthermore, we use c+F to represent the incre-
mental cost incurred by the flexible generating capacity for marginally increasing its production
for balancing (upward regulation) and c−F to denote the incremental utility that it obtains from
marginally decreasing its production for balancing (downward regulation). The demand l is inelas-
tic and known with certainty with a cost of involuntary curtailment denoted by v. In this stylized
power system, it holds that v > c+F ≥ cF ≥ c
−
F ≥ 0. Finally, the power production from renewable
sources is characterized as a random variable W defined on some probability space (Ω,F , P ). Let
F (·) and f(·) denote the cumulative distribution function and the probability density function of
W , respectively. To comfortably deal with the case F (0)> 0 in our mathematical derivations, we
use the generalized inverse cumulative distribution function F−1(α) = inf{x ∈R : F (x)≥α}.
The aim of the forward market is to determine the dispatch of flexible power producers (pF ),
inflexible power producers (pI), and stochastic power producers (pW ) that minimizes (forward)
system operating costs, that is,
Minimize
pF ,pI ,pW
cIpI + cFpF (1a)
s.t. pF + pI + pW − l= 0 : λ
f , (1b)
0≤ pF ≤ pF , (1c)
0≤ pI ≤ pI , (1d)
0≤ pW ≤ p̂W (1e)
Equation (1b) enforces the power balance. We denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the power balance equation by λf , which defines the forward electricity price. The set of inequal-
ities (1c)–(1e) imposes upper and lower bounds on the dispatch of the different power producers.
We explicitly indicate parameter p̂W , which stands for the power production that is expected from
the stochastic power producers, in (1e). We do so to note that, typically, the amount of stochas-
tic power production that can be cleared in the forward market is capped to this expectation
(Bouffard and Galiana 2008, Cadre and Didier 2014, Oggioni et al. 2014, Zavala et al. 2015).
The following proposition provides the optimal solution to problem (1).
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Proposition 1 (The merit-order dispatch solution). Consider the stylized power system
described in Definition 1, where, in addition, it holds that cI < cF . Optimization problem (1)
prompts the following dispatch rule:
Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0 0≤ l≤ p̂W
2. p̂W l− p̂W 0 p̂W < l≤ p̂W + pI
3. p̂W pI l− p̂W − pI p̂W + pI < l≤ p̂W + pI + pF
4. infeasible p̂W + pI + pF < l
This result is well known (see, e.g., Go´mez-Expo´sito et al. (2008, Chapter 5)) and therefore, its
proof is omitted here.
Note that values of load l > p̂W + pI + pF render problem (1) infeasible, because we have not
considered the possibility of shedding load in the forward market.
The conventional market produces a forward dispatch whereby power production is cleared fol-
lowing the so-calledmerit order, i.e., the power plants with the lowest marginal costs are dispatched
first, until the system demand is satisfied. In this case, the dispatch solution prompted by this
market follows from the intersection of the (forward) supply cost function of the system with the
marginal utility demand curve. The supply cost function is built by sorting the marginal cost func-
tions of the individual power plants in increasing order. Consequently, all the production with a
marginal cost lower than the one determined by the said intersection is dispatched.
Optimization problem (1) results, therefore, in the forward dispatch (pF , pI , pW ) given by Propo-
sition 1. Since the stochastic power production cannot be perfectly predicted, the (random) power
imbalanceW −pW is to be covered in the balancing market. For this purpose, flexible power plants
can be re-dispatched and/or the amount of load and stochastic power production can be curtailed.
Suppose a specific realization W (ω), ω ∈Ω, of the stochastic power production. The balancing
market determines the most economical vector of re-dispatch actions that accommodates the power
imbalance W (ω)− pW , that is,
Minimize
p
+
F
(ω),p−
F
(ω),∆pW (ω),s(ω)
vs(ω)+ c+Fp
+
F (ω)− c
−
Fp
−
F (ω) (2a)
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s.t. s(ω)+ p+F (ω)− p
−
F (ω)+∆pW (ω) = 0 : λ
b(ω) , (2b)
0≤ p−F (ω)≤ pF , (2c)
0≤ p+F (ω)≤ pF − pF , (2d)
0≤ pW +∆pW (ω)≤W (ω) , (2e)
0≤ s(ω)≤ l , (2f)
Equation (2b) ensures that the power system is brought to balance by deploying upward or
downward regulation from the flexible power unit, i.e., p+F (ω) or p
−
F (ω), respectively; curtailing
load s(ω) and/or curtailing stochastic power production, which is given by W (ω)− pW −∆pW (ω).
The Lagrange multiplier λb(ω) defines the marginal price that clears the balancing market. The
family of inequalities (2c)–(2f) set limits on the amount of downward and upward regulation that
the flexible power unit can provide, (2c) and (2d), respectively; the amount of stochastic power
production that can be curtailed (2e), and the amount of load that can be shed (2f).
The total expected cost of operating the power system is given by cIpI + cFpF + C
b(pI , pF , pW ),
where Cb(pI , pF , pW ) represents the expected balancing cost computed in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 (Expected balancing cost). Consider the stylized power system described in
Definition 1 with given forward dispatch quantities pI , pF , pW . The expected balancing cost
Cb(pI , pF , pW ) is computed as
Cb(pI , pF , pW ) = v
∫ pF+pW−pF
0
F (ω)dω+ c+F
∫ pW
pF+pW−pF
F (ω)dω+ c−F
∫ pF+pW
pW
F (ω)dω− c−F pF (3)
The proof of this proposition is included in Appendix A. Note that the expected balancing cost
is actually independent of pI .
3. Stochastic or Efficient Two-stage Market (StoM)
We now build the model of a two-stage market where the operation of the forward and the balancing
markets is co-optimized. To this aim, one just needs to replace optimization problem (1) with an
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alternative market-clearing mechanism that seeks to minimize the expected total system operating
cost, namely:
Minimize
pI ,pF ,pW ;p
+
F
(ω),p−
F
(ω),∆pW (ω),s(ω)
cIpI + cFpF +
∫
Ω
(
vs(ω)+ c+Fp
+
F (ω)− c
−
Fp
−
F (ω)
)
f(ω)dω (4a)
s.t. pF + pI + pW − l=0 : ν
f (4b)
s(ω)+ p+F (ω)− p
−
F (ω)+∆pW (ω) = 0 : ν
b(ω)f(ω), ∀ω ∈Ω (4c)
0≤ pF ≤ pF (4d)
0≤ pI ≤ pI (4e)
0≤ p−F (ω)≤ pF , ∀ω ∈Ω (4f)
0≤ p+F (ω)≤ pF − pF , ∀ω ∈Ω (4g)
0≤ pW +∆pW (ω)≤W (ω) : γ(ω), γ(ω), ∀ω ∈Ω (4h)
0≤ s(ω)≤ l, ∀ω ∈Ω (4i)
where the expectation of the balancing cost
∫
Ω
(
vs(ω)+ c+Fp
+
F (ω)− c
−
Fp
−
F (ω)
)
f(ω)dω is taken over
the probability space (Ω,F , P ) on which the stochastic power productionW is defined. Note that,
for ease of notation, we write y(ω) instead of y (W (ω)).
Problem (4) computes the optimal forward dispatch (pF , pI , pW ) by taking into account
the potential cost of the subsequent re-dispatch of the system that is induced by the ran-
dom power imbalance W − pW . Ideally, problem (4) also provides the optimal re-dispatch rule(
p+F (ω), p
−
F (ω),∆pW (ω), s(ω)
)
that guarantees, by enforcing (4c) and (4f)–(4i), the power balance
for any possible outcome W (ω) of the random variable W.
We note that, unlike (1), the forward market (4) does not need to arbitrarily cap the dispatch pW
of stochastic power production, because in (4) the optimization of pW is driven by the probabilistic
characterization of random variable W , which is naturally bounded and nonnegative. By the same
token, we do not need to impose that pW ≥ 0, since c
+
F ≥ cF ≥ c
−
F ≥ 0.
Finally, the balancing stage of this market is also modeled by (2), but with the optimal forward
dispatch (pF , pI , pW ) given by (4).
We now define some relevant concepts that will be used in the remaining part of this paper.
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Definition 2. A two-stage market such as (1)–(2) and (4)–(2) is said to be price consistent if the
forward price is equal to the expected value of the real-time price, that is,
λf =EΩ
[
λb(ω)
]
=
∫
Ω
λb(ω)f(ω)dω (5)
in the case of the conventional two-stage market (1)–(2), and
νf =EΩ
[
νb(ω)
]
=
∫
Ω
νb(ω)f(ω)dω (6)
in the case of the co-optimized two-stage market (4)–(2).
We have taken the term price consistency from Zavala et al. (2015). Definition 2 allows us to
formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Price consistency of the stochastic two-stage market). The two-stage
stochastic market (4)–(2) is price consistent.
Proof. The optimality conditions of problem (4) imply that the derivative of the Lagrangian
with respect to pW and ∆pW (ω) are equal to 0 at the optimal solution, i.e.,
∂L
∂pW
=0 =⇒ νf +
∫
Ω
(
−γ(ω)+ γ(ω)
)
dω=0
∂L
∂∆pW (ω)
= 0 =⇒ νb(ω)f(ω)− γ(ω)+ γ(ω) = 0,∀ω ∈Ω
 =⇒ νf =
∫
Ω
νb(ω)f(ω)dω (7)
where γ(ω) and γ(ω) are the dual variables of constraints (4h). 
Definition 3. Consider the stochastic market-clearing mechanism (4). This mechanism is said to
break or violate the merit order when a conventional generating unit is dispatched in the forward
market ahead of a power generating unit with a lower marginal cost.
Note that this latter definition only applies among conventional power plants and leaves out
stochastic power generating units. In the particular case of the stylized power system introduced
in Definition 1, the merit order is violated if pI < pI and pF > 0 (with cI < cF ) or if pF < pF and
pI > 0 (with cF < cI).
Morales et al. (2012) and Morales et al. (2014b) provide examples of situations in which the
generation dispatch (pF , pI , pW ) that is solution to the stochastic market-clearing mechanism (4)
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violates the merit order. In this paper, we aim at providing analytical insight on the conditions
under which this occurs. Our analysis relies on the following theorem, which is indeed one of the
major results of our work.
Theorem 1 (The stochastic dispatch rule). Consider the stylized power system described in
Definition 1. Now define the constants
l1 := F
−1
(
cF − c
−
F
c+F − c
−
F
)
; (8)
l2 :=min
l≥0
l :
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
+
FF (l)≥ cI (9)
l3 :=min
l≥l1
l : cF +
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )− c
−
F (1−F (l))≥ cI ; (10)
l4 := min
l≥l1+pF
l :
(
v− c−F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
−
FF (l)≥ cI (11)
to which we assign an infinite value in those cases where the corresponding minimization problem
is infeasible. The efficient two-stage market (4) prompts the following dispatch rule, which we refer
to as the stochastic dispatch rule:
Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0
l1 ≥ l2
0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 < l≤ pI + l2
3. l− pI pI 0 pI + l2 < l≤ pI + l1
4. l1 pI l− l1− pI pI + l1 < l≤ pF + pI + l1
5. l− pF − pI pI pF l > pF + pI + l1
6. l 0 0
l1 < l2
0≤ l≤ l1
7. l1 0 l− l1
l3 ≤ l1 + pF
l1 ≤ l≤ l3
8. l1 l− l3 l3− l1 l3 < l≤ pI + l3
9. l1 pI l− l1− pI l3+ pI < l≤ pI + pF + l1
10. l− pI − pF pI pF l > pI + pF + l1
11. l1 0 l− l1
l3 > l1 + pF
l1 ≤ l≤ pF + l1
12. l− pF 0 pF
∃l4
(cI ≤ v)
pF + l1 ≤ l≤ l4
13. l4− pF l− l4 pF l4 ≤ l≤ l4+ pI
14. l− pF − pI pI pF l > l4 + pI
15. l− pF 0 pF ∄l4 l > pF + l1
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The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 can be used to identify cases in which the stochastic market-clearing mechanism (4)
breaks the merit order. For example, consider a power system whose ability to cope with uncertain
supply stems from a small amount of flexible power capacity that is comparatively cheap (cF <
cI ≪ v) and that can provide upward regulation at almost no extra cost (cF . c
+
F ). Under these
conditions, the block of dispatch rules 1–5 (l1 ≥ l2) in Theorem 1 may apply, resulting in the
inflexible generation technology being dispatched over the cheaper flexible one. Intuitively, it makes
economic sense, under these circumstances, to withhold flexible capacity from the forward market
to have it available for upward regulation in real time at almost no extra cost (bear in mind that
the alternative would be to curtail load at the very high cost v).
The mirrored case would be that of a power system with a large amount of flexible, but com-
paratively expensive power capacity (cI < cF ≪ v) that is able to provide downward regulation at
nearly no extra cost (c−F . cF ). In this situation, the block of dispatch rules 6–15 (l1 < l2) would
hold and the flexible capacity would be dispatched over the cheaper inflexible one. The intuition
here is that it is profitable to commit flexible capacity in the forward market to have it available
for accommodating surplus of stochastic power production in real time at nearly no extra cost.
In the sequel, we focus our analysis to those cases in which cI < cF . This is a fairly common
characteristic of many power systems, where, for instance, the base load is mainly supplied by
nuclear and large coal-fired power plants, while balancing is mostly provided by gas-fired power
units. Notice that the fact that cI < cF precludes the stochastic dispatch rule 15 in Theorem 1.
Next we provide results that are directly derived from Theorem 1 for relevant special cases. We
state these results in the form of corollaries.
Corollary 1 (Free downward regulation). Consider the power system described in Defini-
tion 1, where, in addition, we have that 0< cI < cF , cF − c
−
F = 0 (free downward regulation), and
F−1(0) = 0. The stochastic dispatch rule simplifies to:
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Rule # pW pI pF applies if
7. 0 0 l
l3 ≤ pF
0≤ l≤ l3
8. 0 l− l3 l3 l3 < l≤ pI + l3
9. 0 pI l− pI l3 + pI < l≤ pI + pF
10. l− pI − pF pI pF l > pI + pF
11. 0 0 l
l3 > pF
0≤ l≤ pF
12. l− pF 0 pF pF ≤ l≤ l4
13. l4− pF l− l4 pF l4 ≤ l≤ l4 + pI
14. l− pF − pI pI pF l > l4+ pI
Proof. The proof of this corollary directly follows from Theorem 1 and the fact that if cF −c
−
F =
0, then l1 =F
−1(0) = 0< l2. 
The case described in this corollary is, perhaps, the most paradigmatic example of a power
system in which maximum efficiency is to be achieved by breaking the merit order in the forward
market. Indeed, if the provision of downward regulation does not entail any extra cost to the
system (situation that we describe as “free downward regulation”), the more expensive flexible
power capacity should be always dispatched first, even before the cheaper inflexible one, in the hope
that the dispatched flexible capacity can be de-committed to accommodate the eventual stochastic
power production. One can think of the provision of downward regulation as a sort of arbitrage
whereby the flexible generation technology is, in the end, requested not to produce the amount
of power that it was scheduled to supply in advance (Pritchard et al. 2010). Consequently, one
can argue about the reasons why the cost of downward regulation should be different from zero,
that is, cF − c
−
F 6= 0 (such as the potential existence of nonconvex costs that are not captured in
self-commitment based electricity markets).
We now deal with the mirrored case of free upward regulation.
Corollary 2 (Free upward regulation). Consider the power system described in Definition 1,
where, besides, we have that 0< cI < cF and cF − c
+
F = 0 (free upward regulation). The stochastic
dispatch rule boils down to:
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Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0 0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 < l≤ pI + l2
3. l− pI pI 0 pI + l2 < l≤ pI + pW
4. pW pI l− pW − pI pI + pW < l≤ pF + pI + pW
5. l− pF − pI pI pF l > pF + pI + pW
Proof. Again the proof of this corollary directly follows from Theorem 1, by noting that cF > cI
and cF − c
+
F =0 implies l1 =F
−1(1) = pW . Since l2 < pW , then l2 < l1. 
In the case that the provision of upward regulation does not impose any extra cost on the
system (situation that we refer to as “free upward regulation”), the stochastic market-clearing
mechanism (4) prompts forward dispatch solutions that respect the merit order in the forward
market (that is, the more expensive flexible power capacity is only dispatched differently from zero
for levels of load at which the inflexible generation technology is requested to produce at maximum
capacity). As we will show later, this family of dispatch solutions (namely, those honouring the
merit order) can be reproduced, at least partially, by enhanced forms of the conventional two-stage
market.
Corollaries 1 and 2 define two extreme cases of a broader family of power systems characterized by
asymmetric costs for balancing power. In a power system where the cost differential for downward
regulation (cF − c
−
F ) is sufficiently lower than the cost differential for upward regulation (c
+
F − cF ),
the conventional two-stage market will prove to be inefficient, because the most economical way
of operating the power system is that for which the dispatch of the flexible generating capacity is
prioritized over the commitment of the cheaper inflexible one. In the opposite case, where cF − c
−
F
is enough greater than c+F − cF , the most cost-efficient forward dispatch complies with the merit
order and, therefore, could still be induced by the conventional two-stage market. Nevertheless,
one could argue for the case c+F − cF > cF − c
−
F to be the general rule, insofar as the provision of
upward regulation involves generating more energy than scheduled, while the provision of downward
regulation entails not to honour a forward contract.
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We now complement Corollaries 1 and 2 with the following result, which pertains to the case for
which the marginal costs of upward and downward regulation are not marked up with respect to
the forward production costs, that is, c+F − cF = cF − c
−
F =0.
Corollary 3 (Free upward and downward regulation). Consider the power system
described in Definition 1, where, besides, we have that 0< cI < cF and cF − c
+
F = cF − c
−
F = 0 (free
upward and downward regulation). The stochastic dispatch rule reduces to:
Rule # pW + pF pI applies if
1. l 0 0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 l2 < l≤ pI + l2
3. l− pI pI pI + l2 < l
with pW ≥ 0 and pF ≥ 0.
Proof. This result can be proved by noting that if cF − c
+
F = cF − c
−
F = 0, then l2 = l3 = l4. 
Corollary (3) describes a power system for which dispatch and re-dispatch actions are equally
costly. In this case, there is always a forward dispatch solution that satisfies the merit order (by
just setting pF = 0 in rules 1 and 2). As we will see later, this makes it possible to analyze enhanced
variants of the conventional two-stage market that close the cost-efficiency gap with respect to the
ideal stochastic market-clearing mechanism (4).
In the stochastic dispatch rule given by Theorem 1, the capacities of the flexible and inflexible
generation technologies play roles that are as important as their marginal generation costs. In this
vein, Corollary 4 below provides two relevant results. The first one pertains to the case of a power
system where there is enough flexible power capacity to cover any potential lack of stochastic power
production, that is, pF ≥ pW . In an abuse of terminology, we will refer to this instance as “capacity
adequate power system”. The second result constitutes a further simplification of the stochastic
dispatch rule that is possible when, in addition, the range of system loads does not exceed the
capacity of the inflexible generation technology, that is, l≤ pI .
Corollary 4 (Capacity adequate power system). Consider the power system described in
Definition 1, where, in addition, we have that cI < cF and pF ≥ pW . The stochastic dispatch rule
simplifies to:
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Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0
l1 ≥ l2
0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 < l≤ pI + l2
3. l− pI pI 0 pI + l2 < l≤ pI + l1
4. l1 pI l− l1− pI pI + l1 < l≤ pF + pI + l1
5. l− pF − pI pI pF l > pF + pI + l1
6. l 0 0
l1 < l2
0≤ l≤ l1
7. l1 0 l− l1 l1 ≤ l≤ l3
8. l1 l− l3 l3− l1 l3 < l≤ pI + l3
9. l1 pI l− l1− pI l3+ pI < l≤ pI + pF + l1
10. l− pI − pF pI pF l > pI + pF + l1
where:
l2 = F
−1
(
cI
c+F
)
and l3 =max
(
l1, F
−1
(
1−
cF − cI
c−F
))
with l1 ≤ l3 ≤ pF .
If, in addition, we have that l≤ pI , the stochastic dispatch rule further reduces to:
Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0
l1 ≥ l2
0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 < l
6. l 0 0
l1 < l2
0≤ l≤ l1
7. l1 0 l− l1 l1 ≤ l≤ l3
8. l1 l− l3 l3− l1 l3 < l
The proof of Corollary 4 is provided in Appendix C.
For the sake of illustration, later on we will discuss examples for which the conditions of Corollary
4 hold. Notice that, despite the fact that these conditions are quite restrictive, they prompt a
simplified stochastic dispatch rule that still include cases for which the merit order is broken (see
rules 7 and 8).
To conclude this section, we would like to point out the case of symmetric balancing costs, that
is, cF − c
+
F = cF − c
−
F = ∆. By Equation (8), we arrive at l1 = F
−1(0.5), which is the median of
the probability distribution that characterizes the stochastic power production. If, besides, this
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probability distribution is symmetric, l1 is equal to its expected value. Under symmetric balancing
costs and pF ≥ pW , the stochastic dispatch rule yields solutions that violate the merit order if
cI > 0.5c
+
F for the case in which cF > cI .
4. A Price-consistent Conventional Two-stage Market (ConvM-VB): The Role
of Virtual Bidding
The stochastic two-stage market StoM ensures maximum cost-efficiency and price-consistency. In
contrast, it may violate the merit order and as a result, dispatch conventional generating units in
a loss-making position in the forward market (Morales et al. 2014b). In this section, we analyze an
enhanced form of the conventional two-stage market (1)–(2) that, by construction, ensures price
consistency and preserves the merit order. Mathematically, we can get price-consistent solutions
out of (1)–(2) by freeing variable pW ≥ 0, which represents the forward dispatch of the stochastic
power capacity, while at the same time enforcing the additional constraint λf =EΩ [λ
b(ω)]. As we
show below, to do so, we need to pose the price-consistent conventional two-stage market as a
complementarity problem.
In practice, price-consistent solutions can be theoretically obtained from a conventional two-
stage market where virtual bidding is allowed and exercised by a risk-neutral arbitrager that has
perfect knowledge of the market price distribution (induced by the uncertain power supply). For
this purpose, we solve the system of non-linear equations that results from concatenating the KKT
conditions of the following optimization problems:
Clearing of the forward market
Minimize
pF ,pI ,pW
cFpF + cIpI (12a)
s.t. pF + pI + pW + pV = l : λ
f (12b)
0≤ pW ≤ p̂W (12c)
0≤ pF ≤ pF (12d)
0≤ pI ≤ pI (12e)
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where pV is the optimal virtual bid coming from the arbitrager’s problem below. Notice that we
assume that the bid price of the virtual bidder is zero.
Clearing of the balancing market
Minimize
p
+
F
(ω),p−
F
(ω),∆pW (ω),s(ω)
p+F (ω)c
+
F − p
−
F (ω)c
−
F + vs(ω) (13a)
s.t. p+F (ω)− p
−
F (ω)+∆pW (ω)+∆pV (ω)+ s(ω) = 0 : λ
b(ω) (13b)
0≤ p+F (ω)≤ pF − pF (13c)
0≤ p−F (ω)≤ pF (13d)
0≤ pW +∆pW (ω)≤W (ω) (13e)
0≤ s(ω)≤ l (13f)
where pW and pF are given by problem (12) and ∆pV (ω) is the amount of electricity resold, if
positive, or repurchased, if negative, by the virtual bidder in the balancing market.
Arbitrager’s problem
Maximize
pV ,∆pV (ω)
pV λ
f +
∫
Ω
∆pV (ω)λ
b(ω)f(ω)dω (14a)
s.t. pV +∆pV (ω) = 0, (14b)
where λf is given as the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (12b) and λb(ω) as the
Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (13b).
We now characterize the solution to the system of KKT conditions associated with the convex
optimization problems (12), (13) and (14) (the so-called short-run equilibrium solution). Notice
that the forward dispatch associated with this solution exhibits a fundamental property, namely,
it satisfies the merit order, while leading to price-consistency.
Theorem 2 (A price-consistent conventional two-stage market). Consider the stylized
power system described in Definition 1. Consider also the equilibrium problem that results from
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simultaneously enforcing the optimality conditions of problems (12), (13) and (14), where cI < cF .
Define the constants
l2 :=min
l≥0
l :
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
+
FF (l)≥ cI (15)
l5 :=min
l≥0
l :
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF − pI)+ c
+
FF (l− pI)≥ cF (16)
l6 :=min
l≥0
l :
(
v− c−F
)
F (l− pF − pI)+ c
−
FF (l− pI)≥ cF (17)
and the function l7 :R≥0→R≥0,
l7(l) =F
−1
(
cF −
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pI − pF )− c
−
FF (l− pI)
c+F − c
−
F
)
. (18)
Note that, by construction, l2 ≤ l5 ≤ l6. The equilibrium solution is given by:
Rule # pW + pV pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0 0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 < l≤ l2+ pI
3. l− pI pI 0 l2 + pI < l≤ l5
4. l7(l) pI l− l7(l)− pI l5 < l≤ l6
5. l− pF − pI pI pF l6 < l
in all cases with pW ≤ p̂W .
A proof for this theorem can be found in Appendix D.
We can now use this theorem to provide conditions under which the conventional two-stage
market with virtual bidding results in maximum cost-efficiency.
Corollary 5 (Merit-order dispatch solution with virtual bidding). Consider the power
system described in Definition 1, where, in addition, we have that cI < cF . The expected system
operating cost associated with the price-consistent merit-order dispatch solution is equal to that of
the stochastic dispatch solution in any of the following cases:
1. l1 ≥ l2 and 0≤ l≤min (pI + l1, l5);
2.
cF−c
−
F
c
+
F
−c
−
F
≥ cI
c
+
F
and 0≤ l≤ pI + l1 provided that pF > pW (capacity adequate power system).
3. l /∈ (l5, pW + pI + pF ) if c
+
F = cF (free upward regulation).
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4. 0≤ l≤ pI + pW or l≥ pW + pI + pF , if c
+
F = cF and pF > pW (i.e., free upward regulation in a
capacity adequate power system).
5. cF = c
+
F = c
−
F (free upward and downward regulation).
Furthermore, if cF = c
−
F (free downward regulation), c
+
F − cF > 0, and F
−1 (0) = 0, then the
price-consistent conventional two-stage market does not deliver maximum cost-efficiency except for
l≥max(l6, l4+ pI) when l3 > pF , and l≥max(l6, pF + pI) otherwise.
The proof of Corollary 5 is provided in Appendix E.
It is apparent that enforcing price consistency, through the introduction of virtual bidding,
makes the dispatch solution of the conventional two-stage market substantially more intricate. Most
importantly, virtual bidding enhances the efficiency of the conventional two-stage market to such an
extent that the cost-efficiency gap with respect to the stochastic dispatch solution is closed under
certain conditions. In essence, the ability of virtual bidding to close this gap is mostly determined
by the relation between the characteristic system constants l1 and l2. On the one hand, the value
of l1 (which is the solution to a news-vendor-type of problem as remarked in Appendix B) is driven
by the relation between the cost of providing downward regulation versus the cost of providing
upward regulation. On the other, the value of l2 weighs the cost of dispatching the inflexible power
capacity against the cost of dispatching the stochastic power capacity. The former action incurs a
marginal cost of cI , while the latter entails a probable marginal cost of c
+
F , or v in the worst-case
scenario, given that any potential shortage of stochastic power production will have to be covered
with upward regulation from the flexible generation technology and/or load curtailment.
Thus, the effectiveness of virtual bidding to increase the cost-efficiency of the conventional two-
stage market is greater for those power systems with a fleet of cheap inflexible power plants and
comparatively costly means for downward regulation (l1 ≥ l2). In such a case, virtual bidding can
even drive the conventional two-stage market to maximum cost-efficiency for a range of system
loads.
As previously mentioned, the conventional two-stage market with virtual bidding yields dis-
patch solutions that respect the merit order, while resulting in price-consistency. This leads to an
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interesting conclusion. Even under those conditions for which the merit order is preserved in the
stochastic dispatch rule (l1 ≥ l2), a price-consistent conventional two-stage market does not nec-
essarily deliver maximum cost-efficiency. This happens, for example, in the load range l5 < l < l6.
This implies that a price-consistent merit-order market solution is not, in general, the merit-order
market solution that minimizes the expected system operating cost. This will become more clear in
the illustrative example below and when we introduce, later on, the conventional two-stage market
with centralized dispatch of stochastic power production.
4.1. Example 1
In this example we consider the stylized power system described in Definition 1 with v =
$1000/MWh. The uncertain power supply comes from a wind power farm whose capacity factor is
assumed to follow a Beta distribution. The mean (κ) and standard deviation (σ) of this distribution
are linked together through the empirical relationship (19) provided in Fabbri et al. (2005). The
shape parameters α and β of the Beta distribution modeling the wind power capacity factor are,
consequently, computed according to (20).
σ =0.01837+0.20355 ·κ . (19)
α=
(1−κ) ·κ ·κ
σ2
−κ, β =α
(
1−κ
κ
)
. (20)
The expected wind power production is hence given by the product of the predicted wind power
capacity factor κ and the wind power capacity pW .
We now examine and compare the stochastic two-stage market and the conventional two-stage
market with and without virtual bidding. For this purpose, we consider the three illustrative cases
collated in Table 1 and discussed below. Table 2 provides the dispatch solution (pI , pF , pW ), or
(pI , pF , pW + pV ), and the expected total operating cost prompted by the efficient two-stage market
and the conventional two-stage market with and without virtual bidding. This table also includes
the forward price λf and the expected real-time price λb under each of the markets, and the
incremental running cost in percentage with respect to the most cost-efficient dispatch solution,
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pI pF pW cI cF c
+
F c
−
F l κ
Case a) 500 500 100 30 35 35 30 250 0.5
Case b) 500 500 100 30 35 40 30 250 0.5
Case c) 100 50 100 30 35 35 30 170 0.5
Table 1 Example 1: Data. System load and capacities are given in MW and marginal costs in $/MWh.
which is the one provided by the stochastic two-stage market, logically. In the sequel, we will refer
to this incremental cost simply as efficiency gap.
• Case a) considers a power system with asymmetric balancing costs, in which upward regu-
lation is less costly than downward regulation. More specifically, this instance corresponds to a
capacity adequate power system with free upward regulation. Hence, the results in Corollary 2
apply and, accordingly, the stochastic two-stage market provides a solution that respects the merit
order, because the capacity of the more expensive flexible power generation is reserved to deploy
upward regulation in real time, when needed. Naturally, the conventional two-stage market always
yields, by construction, a dispatch solution that satisfies the merit order. However, in the case that
virtual bidding is not allowed, the conventional two-stage market clears the expected wind power
production, which is, in general, a suboptimal dispatch decision in terms of market efficiency and
as such, results in an efficiency gap greater than zero. On the contrary, the introduction of virtual
bidding not only induces a price-consistent market solution, but also fully closes the efficiency gap.
This result is consistent with Claim 4 in Corollary 5, since 0 ≤ l ≤ pI + pW , with l = 250 MW,
pI =500 MW, and pW = 100 MW.
• Case b) represents a capacity adequate power system identical to that of Case a), except for
the fact that the provision of upward regulation is now costly, that is, c+F > cF . In particular, we
have that c+F − cF = cF − c
−
F = $5/MWh (symmetric balancing costs). Besides, since l < pI , the
second result in Corollary 4 applies. Lastly, because cI > 0.5c
+
F , the stochastic two-stage market
provides a dispatch solution that breaks the merit order. Evidently, the conventional two-stage
market cannot replicate such a dispatch, irrespective of whether virtual bidding is permitted or
not. Nevertheless, virtual bidding reduces the efficiency gap, while ensuring price consistency.
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pW (+pV ) pI pF λ
f λb cost gap
StoM 63.5 186.5 0 30 30 6095 -
Case a) ConvM 50 200 0 30 17.5 6170 1.2%
ConvM-VB 63.5 186.5 0 30 30 6095 0%
StoM 50.5 188.5 11 30 30 6139 -
Case b) ConvM 50 200 0 30 20 6195 0.9%
ConvM-VB 58.5 191.5 0 30 30 6154 0.2%
StoM 70 100 0 37.09 37.09 3717 -
Case c) ConvM 50 100 20 35 34.83 3740 0.6%
ConvM-VB 51.5 100 18.5 35 35 3737 0.5%
Table 2 Example 1: Results. Power dispatch values are given in MW, prices in $/MWH, cost in $/h, and
incremental cost (efficiency gap) in percentage.
• Case c) is also similar to Case a), but with reduced generating capacities and system load. In
fact, this instance corresponds to a capacity inadequate power system with free upward regulation.
Consequently, results from Corollary 2 hold and the stochastic two-stage market prompts a dispatch
solution that does comply with the merit order. However, as opposed to what happens in Case a),
not even virtual bidding is able to close the efficiency gap under the conventional two-stage market
in this instance. This shows that a price-consistent merit-order-based market does not necessarily
deliver maximum cost-efficiency.
To conclude this example, we investigate how the mean capacity factor κ and the forecast horizon
impacts the efficiency gap. To this aim, we consider Case d), for which data is provided in Table 3.
Note that this case corresponds to a capacity adequate power system with asymmetric balancing
costs. To be more precise, the provision of downward regulation in this system does not entail
any extra operating cost since c−F = cF = $35/MWh. Therefore, results from Corollary 1, which
in general render a dispatch solution that violates the merit order, apply. Accordingly, we should
expect that the dispatch solutions induced by the conventional two-stage market, both with and
without virtual bidding, feature a nonzero efficiency gap in this case.
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pI pF pW cI cF c
+
F c
−
F l
Case d) 500 500 100 30 35 40 35 250
Table 3 Example 1: Data for Case d).
This is confirmed by the plots in Figure 1, which illustrate such an efficiency gap in percentage
(on the y-axis) for different values of κ (on the x-axis) and forecast horizons (i.e., time spans in
between the clearings of the forward and the real-time markets), namely, 1, 24 and 48 hours. Each
forecast horizon is associated with a different empirical relationship between σ and κ in the form
of (20), all of which have been taken from Fabbri et al. (2005). The continuous and dashed lines
correspond to the cases with and without virtual bidding, respectively.
Two observations are in order: First, the efficiency gap increases as the time distance in between
the closures of the forward and the real-time market augments. This is hardly a surprising result
related to the fact that uncertainty in wind power production grows as does the forecast lead
time. Second, virtual bidding, or more generally, a price-consistent conventional two-stage market,
can substantially reduce the efficiency gap as compared to the case of a conventional market that
does not ensure price consistency, particularly in those situations where the contribution of the
stochastic power production is expected to be important.
Finally, it is worth noting that the efficiency gap decreases for high values of κ in the case where
virtual bidding is allowed. This is a direct consequence of the fact that, as the value of κ grows,
the resulting wind power distribution becomes more and more skewed towards high wind power
production values. Intuitively speaking, the probability mass concentrates more and more towards
values of wind power production closer to the wind farm capacity pW as κ increases, a phenomenon
that virtual bidding captures and takes advantage of.
5. A Conventional Two-stage Market with Centralized Dispatch of the
Stochastic Power Production (ConvM-CD)
In the sequel, we analyze a variant of the conventional two-stage market (1)–(2), whereby the
forward dispatch pW of stochastic power capacity is centralized and determined by a non-profit and
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Figure 1 Efficiency gap for different expected wind power capacity factors and forecast horizons
all-knowing entity that seeks to minimize the expected total system operating cost. A transmission
system operator, for example, could take on this role. The mathematical model that we present
next to simulate this market organization is inspired from the one introduced in Morales et al.
(2014b) and takes the form of the following bilevel linear programming problem.
Minimize
pF ,pI ,pW ;p
+
F
(ω),p−
F
(ω),∆pW (ω),s(ω)
cIpI + cFpF +
∫
Ω
(
c+Fp
+
F (ω)− c
−
Fp
−
F (ω)+ vs(ω)
)
f(ω)dω (21a)
s.t. p+F (ω)− p
−
F (ω)+∆pW (ω)+ s(ω) = 0 : λ
b(ω), ∀ω ∈Ω (21b)
0≤ p+F (ω)≤ pF − pF , ∀ω ∈Ω (21c)
0≤ p−F (ω)≤ pF , ∀ω ∈Ω (21d)
0≤ pW ≤ pW , ∀ω ∈Ω (21e)
0≤ pW +∆pW (ω)≤W (ω), ∀ω ∈Ω (21f)
0≤ s(ω)≤ l, ∀ω ∈Ω (21g)
(pF , pI) ∈ arg

Minimize
xF ,xI
cFxF + cIxI
s.t. xF +xI + pW = l : λ
f
0≤ xF ≤ pF
0≤ xI ≤ pI

.
(21h)
(21i)
(21j)
(21k)
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Essentially, the lower-level problem (21h)–(21k) models the clearing of the forward market as
a function of the amount pW of stochastic power production that is dispatched. This amount is
determined by the upper-level problem (21a)–(21g) with a view to minimizing the expected total
system operating cost (21a). To this aim, the upper-level problem explicitly anticipates, through
(21b)–(21g), the projected re-dispatch actions that will need to be undertaken for any possible
realization ω of the stochastic power production. What is most important, though, is that the
bilevel linear model (21) yields, by construction, a market solution that, while preserving the merit
order (due to the enforcement of (21h)–(21k)), results in maximum cost-efficiency.
The following theorem characterizes the solution to the bilevel linear programming problem (21).
Theorem 3 (A conventional two-stage market with centralized dispatch of pW ).
Consider the power system described in Definition 1 with cI < cF . The solution to the bilevel linear
programming problem (21) is given by:
Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0 0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 ≤ l≤ pI + l2
3. l− pI pI 0 l1 ≥ l2 pI + l2 ≤ l≤ pI + l1
4. l1 pI l− pI − l1 pI + l1 ≤ l≤ pI + pF + l1
5. l− pI − pF pI pF pI + pF + l1 ≤ l
6. l 0 0
l1 < l2
0≤ l≤min(l2, l8)
7. l2 l− l2 0 l2 ≤ l≤ l8
8. l1 pI l− pI − l1 l8 ≤ l≤ pI + pF + l1
9. l− pI − pF pI pF max(l8, pI + pF + l1)≤ l
where constant l8 is defined when l1 < l2 as:
l8 := x : l1+ pI ≤ x≤ l2+ pI and cI (pI −max(x− l2,0))−
∫ min(x−pI ,l1+pF )
min(x−pI ,l1)
(A(s)−B(s))ds−
−
∫ x−pI
min(x−pI ,l1+pF )
(A(s)−C(s))ds−
∫ min(x,l2)
x−pI
A(s)ds=0, (22)
with (23)
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A(s) := (v− c+F )F (s− pF )+ c
+
FF (s) (24)
B(s) := cF +
(
v− c+F
)
F (s− pF )− c
−
F (1−F (s)) (25)
C(s) :=
(
v− c−F
)
F (s− pF )+ c
−
FF (s) (26)
A proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix F.
As we did for the case of the conventional two-stage market with virtual bidding, we can now use
Theorem 3 to identify conditions under which a conventional two-stage market with centralized
dispatch of the stochastic power production delivers maximum cost-efficiency.
Corollary 6 (Cost-efficient merit-order dispatch solution). Consider the power system
described in Definition 1, where, in addition, we have that cI < cF . The expected system operating
cost associated with the merit-order dispatch solution provided by the bilevel linear programming
problem (21) is equal to that of the stochastic dispatch solution in any of the following cases:
1. l1 ≥ l2;
2. Whenever the stochastic dispatch solution satisfies the merit order;
3. Whenever the stochastic dispatch solution is such that pI = pI ;
4. cF = c
+
F = c
−
F (free upward and downward regulation).
The proof of Corollary 6 is provided in Appendix G.
Interestingly, the previous results show that all the stochastic dispatch solutions that do not
violate the merit order could be recovered, in principle, from a conventional two-stage market,
if we let an all-knowing and social-welfare-maximizer entity (for example, a TSO) control the
dispatch of the stochastic power production. This implies that a TSO could close the efficiency
gap between the stochastic and the conventional two-stage markets in many cases where virtual
bidding fails to do so. On the other hand, neither a TSO nor virtual bidding are able to close such
a gap in all those cases where maximum cost-efficiency requires breaking the merit order. In those
cases, though, a TSO would be able to reduce the efficiency loss further than virtual bidding. In
this vein, when compared with the results provided in Theorems 1 and 3, the dispatch solution
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induced by a conventional two-stage market with virtual bidding reveals that price-consistency
does not necessarily implies maximum cost-efficiency. But it is more interesting yet to notice that
this conclusion also means that the conventional two-stage market with centralized dispatch of
the stochastic power production can deliver dispatch solutions that are price inconsistent. Indeed,
Theorem 2 tells us that this may happen in the range of loads in between l5 and l6. We illustrate
one of these cases in the example of Section 5.1.
We conclude with the corollary below, which states that the price-consistent and the cost-efficient
merit-order dispatch solutions are equivalent when the inflexible generating capacity is sufficiently
large.
Corollary 7 (Merit-order dispatch solution with large inflexible power capacity).
Consider the stylized power system described in Definition 1 with pI ≥ l. Then, the solutions of the
bilevel model (21) and the complementarity model consisting of the KKT conditions of problems
(12), (13) and (14) are the same. The dispatch rule in that case is given by:
Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0 0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 < l
Proof. From Theorem 2, only rules 1 and 2 apply for pI ≥ l. From Theorem 3 with l1 ≥ l2 and
pI ≥ l, only rules 1 and 2 apply. Furthermore, if l1 < l2 and pI ≥ l, then l8 ≥ l and consequently,
only rules 6 and 7 in Theorem 3 apply. 
5.1. Example 2
The main purpose of this example is to illustrate the key differences between the merit-order
dispatch solutions provided by the two enhanced variants of the conventional two-stage market
that we have examined in this paper, namely, that in which virtual bidding is allowed (ConvM-VB)
and that in which the stochastic power production is centrally dispatched (ConvM-CD). To this
aim, we consider Case e), for which data is provided in Table 4. Note that this new case is identical
to Case d), but for a different system load of 155 MW. Results for the several markets analyzed are
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collated in Table 5. These results consist of dispatched quantities (pW , pI , pF ) or (pW + pV , pI , pF ),
as appropriate; forward price (λf); expected real-time price (λb); expected total system operating
cost (cost), and efficiency gap.
Case e) corresponds to a capacity inadequate power system with asymmetric balancing costs. In
particular, the provision of downward regulation in this system is free in the sense that c−F = cF .
Therefore, the stochastic dispatch rule is governed by the results of Corollary 1, which generally
prompt dispatch solutions that break the merit order, as is the case here (see row labeled “StoM” in
Table 5). Hence, none of the enhanced variants of the conventional two-stage market we consider,
i.e., ConvM-VB and ConvM-CD, are able to close the efficiency gap (see column tagged as “gap”
in Table 5).
The stochastic two-stage market delivers minimum expected system operating cost at the same
time that it guarantees price consistency. However, in order to produce a price-consistent and max-
imum cost-efficient dispatch solution, it has to violate the merit order. This has important negative
implications towards the actual implementation of this market-clearing procedure (Morales et al.
2014b). As an example, it is easy to infer from the results in Table 5 that the flexible power
capacity is dispatched in a loss-making position under the stochastic two-stage market, because
the forward price equals $30/MWh, whereas the marginal production cost of the flexible power
generation technology is $35/MWh.
On the other hand, the conventional two-stage market with virtual bidding (ConvM-VB) pro-
duces a price-consistent dispatch solution that respects the merit order, but that is not the best
in terms of cost efficiency. Indeed, the market solution provided by ConvM-VB is even less cost-
efficient than the one delivered by the plain conventional two-stage market (ConvM). Although
this should be regarded as a rare case, it shows that ensuring price consistency does not necessarily
lead to higher market efficiency (understood as the minimization of system operating costs).
Lastly, the conventional market with centralized dispatch of the stochastic power production
(ConvM-CD) yields the most cost-efficient dispatch solution among those that comply with the
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pI pF pW cI cF c
+
F c
−
F l κ
Case e) 100 50 100 30 35 40 35 155 0.5
Table 4 Example 2: Data. System load and capacities are given in MW and marginal costs in $/MWh.
pW (+pV ) pI pF λ
f λb cost gap
Case e)
StoM 18.5 92.5 44 30 30 3245 -
ConvM 50 100 5 35 25.42 3296 1.6%
ConvM-VB 58.5 96.5 0 30 30 3304 1.8%
ConvM-CD 18.5 100 36.5 35 22.93 3272 0.8%
Table 5 Example 2: Results. Power dispatch values are given in MW, prices in $/MWh, cost in $/h, and
incremental cost (efficiency gap) in percentage.
merit order. Note that ConvM-CD gets to reduce the efficiency gap by half. To do so, however, it
must relinquish price-consistency.
In short, preserving the merit order in forward electricity markets with uncertain supply implies
giving up on cost-efficiency or price-consistency (or both).
6. Conclusions
The overall message that emerges from our analysis is that the concepts of merit order, cost-
efficiency, and price-consistency are conflicting requirements that cannot be met together in an
electricity market. Indeed, preserving the merit order generally comes at the expense of market
efficiency, either in the form of price-inconsistent or cost-inefficient market solutions.
We have reached this conclusion after examining four types of two-stage markets with uncertain
supply, in which only one or two of the above requirements can be guaranteed in general. We
have provided mathematical formulations for these four types of markets and explain how these
mathematical abstractions translate into practice.
Our study has also revealed general conditions under which preserving the merit order is most
likely to jeopardize cost-efficiency and/or price-consistency. Interestingly, this seems to be the case
of power systems that are capacity inadequate (broadly understood as a power system where the
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complete lost of the uncertain supply cannot be covered with economical flexible power generation)
and/or where the provision of upward regulation is costly, while the provision of downward regu-
lation comparatively imposes little or no extra cost at all to the system. Likewise, our study has
identified general conditions under which the merit order, price-consistency and cost-efficiency can
indeed be met together. This is, for example, the case of power systems where the implementation
of real-time adjustments do not entail opportunity costs.
In an attempt to keep our investigation essentially analytical, we have built our market models
on a stylized power system with infinite transmission capacity. Consequently, a natural avenue for
future research is to elucidate whether more realistic assumptions on the underlying power system
can diminish the loss of efficiency caused by the merit order or even limit the cases of inefficiency
to a few “degenerate” ones. To this end, we are most likely to abandon our analytical approach
and make use of computational simulation instead.
On a different front, our analysis has considered energy-only electricity markets. Therefore,
another logical direction for future work is to investigate whether the consideration of other types
of market mechanisms could reduce or even nullify the loss of efficiency associated with the preser-
vation of the merit order. In this regard, we conjecture, based on our results, that appropriate
markets for downward operating reserve might do the trick.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For given values of pF and pW , the optimal re-dispatch actions
p+F (ω), p
−
F (ω),∆pW (ω), s(ω) are determined by solving the following optimization problem.
Minimize
p
+
F
(ω),p−
F
(ω),∆pW (ω),s(ω)
∫
Ω
(
vs(ω)+ c+Fp
+
F (ω)− c
−
Fp
−
F (ω)
)
f(ω)dω (27a)
s.t. s(ω)+ p+F (ω)− p
−
F (ω)+∆pW (ω) = 0, ∀ω ∈Ω (27b)
0≤ p−F (ω)≤ pF , ∀ω ∈Ω (27c)
0≤ p+F (ω)≤ pF − pF , ∀ω ∈Ω (27d)
0≤ pW +∆pW (ω)≤W (ω), ∀ω ∈Ω (27e)
0≤ s(ω)≤ pF + pW , ∀ω ∈Ω (27f)
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Depending on whether the realized stochastic generation W (ω) is higher or lower than the
dispatched quantity pW , the re-dispatch rule for each scenario ω is given by:
If W (ω)≤ pW

p+F (ω) =min (pF − pF , pW −W (ω))
p−F (ω) = 0
s(ω) =max(0, pW −W (ω)− pF + pF )
(28)
If W (ω)>pW

p+F (ω) = 0
p−F (ω) =min (pF ,W (ω)− pW )
s(ω) = 0
(29)
Therefore, the second-stage expected cost can be computed as:∫
Ω
(
vs(ω)+ c+Fp
+
F (ω)− c
−
Fp
−
F (ω)
)
f(ω)dω=
=
∫ pW
0
(
vs(ω)+ c+Fp
+
F (ω)− c
−
Fp
−
F (ω)
)
f(ω)dω+
∫ ∞
pW
(
vs(ω)+ c+Fp
+
F (ω)− c
−
Fp
−
F (ω)
)
f(ω)dω=
=
∫ pW
0
vs(ω)f(ω)dω+
∫ pW
0
c+Fp
+
F (ω)f(ω)dω−
∫ ∞
pW
c−F p
−
F (ω)f(ω)dω=
= v
∫ pF+pW−pF
0
(pW −W (ω)− pF + pF )f(ω)dω+ c
+
F
∫ pF+pW−pF
0
(pF − pF )f(ω)dω+
+ c+F
∫ pW
pF+pW−pF
(pW −W (ω))f(ω)dω− c
−
F
∫ pF+pW
pW
(W (ω)− pW )f(ω)dω− c
−
F
∫ ∞
pF+pW
pFf(ω)dω=
= v (pF + pW − pF )F (pF + pW − pF )− v
∫ pF+pW−pF
0
W (ω)f(ω)dω+
+ c+F (pF − pF − pW )F (pF + pW − pF )+ c
+
FpWF (pW )− c
+
F
∫ pW
pF+pW−pF
W (ω)f(ω)dω+
+ c−F (pF + pW )F (pF + pW )− c
−
FpWF (pW )− c
−
F pF − c
−
F
∫ pF+pW
pW
W (ω)f(ω)dω=
= v
∫ pF+pW−pF
0
F (ω)dω+ c+F
∫ pW
pF+pW−pF
F (ω)dω+ c−F
∫ pF+pW
pW
F (ω)dω− c−FpF (30)
where, in the last equality, we have used the integration-by-parts theorem, according to which∫ x2
x1
sf(s)ds= x2F (x2)−x1F (x1)−
∫ x2
x1
F (s)ds. 
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the proposition presented and proven below.
Proposition 4. Consider a power system as described in Definition 1 in which the dispatch of the
inflexible unit pI is given. Let p˜ then denote the net load to be satisfied by the flexible and stochastic
power generating units. The dispatch rule for the flexible and stochastic generation is given by:
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Rule # pW pF applies if
1. p˜ 0 0≤ p˜≤ l1
2. l1 p˜− l1 l1 < p˜< l1+ pF
3. p˜− pF pF l1+ pF ≤ p˜
Likewise, the marginal production cost of the flexible-stochastic generation portfolio, denoted by
c˜, writes as:
c˜=

(
v− c+F
)
F (p˜− pF )+ c
+
FF (p˜) if 0≤ p˜≤ l1
cF +
(
v− c+F
)
F (p˜− pF )− c
−
F (1−F (p˜)) if l1 < p˜ < l1+ pF(
v− c−F
)
F (p˜− pF )+ c
−
FF (p˜) if l1+ pF ≤ p˜
(31)
Proof. Using Proposition 2, the optimal forward dispatch of a portfolio of flexible and stochastic
power generation is given as the solution to the following optimization problem:
Minimize z˜ = cFpF + v
∫ p˜−pF
0
F (ω)dω+ c+F
∫ p˜−pF
p˜−pF
F (ω)dω+ c−F
∫ p˜
p˜−pF
F (ω)dω− c−FpF (32a)
s.t. 0≤ pF ≤ pF :
(
γ, γ
)
(32b)
where γ, γ are dual variables and pW = p˜−pF . Problem (32) is a convex optimization problem that
satisfies a Slater condition and therefore, the KKT conditions below are necessary and sufficient
for optimality.
∂z˜
∂pF
− γ+ γ = 0 (33a)
0≤ pF ⊥ γ ≥ 0 (33b)
0≤ (pF − pF )⊥ γ ≥ 0 (33c)
where
∂z˜
∂pF
=
(
cF − c
−
F
)
−
(
c+F − c
−
F
)
F (p˜− pF ) (34)
We now determine the optimal solution to problem (32) by exhaustively enumerating the points
that satisfy the optimality conditions (33) as follows:
a) pF =0
(33c)→ γ = 0
(33a)→
∂z˜
∂pF
≥ 0 =⇒ F (p˜)≤
cF − c
−
F
c+F − c
−
F
b) 0< pF < pF
(33b)→ γ =0
(33c)→ γ =0
(33a)→
∂z˜
∂pF
= 0 =⇒ F (p˜− pF ) =
cF − c
−
F
c+F − c
−
F
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c) pF = pF
(33b)→ γ = 0
(33a)→ F (p˜− pF )≥
cF − c
−
F
c+F − c
−
F
Since pW = p˜−pF , the solutions of cases a)–c) can be summarized as the following dispatch rule:
pW =

p˜ if 0≤ p˜≤ l1
l1 if l1 < p˜ < l1+ pF
p˜− pF if l1+ pF ≤ p˜
(35)
where l1 = F
−1
(
cF−c
−
F
c
+
F
−c
−
F
)
. The marginal production cost of the flexible-stochastic generation port-
folio c˜ is equal to ∂z˜
∂p˜
, that is,
c˜=

(
v− c+F
)
F (p˜− pF )+ c
+
FF (p˜) if 0≤ p˜≤ l1
cF +
(
v− c+F
)
F (p˜− pF )− c
−
F (1−F (p˜)) if l1 < p˜< l1+ pF(
v− c−F
)
F (p˜− pF )+ c
−
FF (p˜) if l1+ pF ≤ p˜
(36)
Note that the functions pW (p˜) and c˜ (p˜) are increasing and continuous on p˜. 
Remark 1 (News-vendor solution). The characteristic constant l1 in (35) and (36) can be
interpreted as the solution to the classical news-vendor problem (Raiffa and Schlaifer 2000):
qopt = F
−1
(
p− c
p+h
)
(37)
where qopt is the optimal stocking quantity of the news-vendor, F (·) is the cumulative distribution
function of the demand to be satisfied, c is the variable production cost, and p and h correspond
to the penalty cost of unsatisfied orders and the inventory holding cost, respectively. The analogy
works, thus, as follows: The variable cost of the stochastic power production is zero, i.e., c= 0; p=
cF − c
−
F represents the penalty cost of dispatching less stochastic power capacity than its eventual
power production, since the consequent power surplus is to be compensated for by a decrease in
the flexible power generation (downward regulation); finally, h = c+F − cF provides the marginal
cost of dispatching more stochastic power capacity than its eventual real-time power production,
because the consequent generation deficit is to be covered with an increase in the flexible power
generation (upward regulation). Therefore,
qopt = F
−1
(
p− c
p+h
)
= F−1
(
cF − c
−
F
cF − c
−
F + c
+
F − cF
)
= F−1
(
cF − c
−
F
c+F − c
−
F
)
= l1. (38)
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Remark 2 (Discrete probability distribution). Proposition 4 assumes a continuous prob-
ability distribution for the uncertain electricity supply, which implies that objective function (32a)
is differentiable. If the uncertain supply is, in contrast, characterized by a discrete probability dis-
tribution, the cumulative distribution function F (·) is stepwise and thus, objective function (32a)
becomes nondifferentiable. In that case, the sub-derivative of the objective function should be used
instead to formulate the KKT optimality conditions as follows:
∂z˜−
∂pF
+ γ− γ ≤ 0≤
∂z˜+
∂pF
+ γ− γ (39a)
0≤ pF ⊥ γ ≥ 0 (39b)
0≤ (pF − pF )⊥ γ ≥ 0 (39c)
where
∂z˜+
∂pF
= cF − c
−
F −
(
c+F − c
−
F
)
F (p˜− pF ) (40a)
∂z˜−
∂pF
= cF − c
−
F −
(
c+F − c
−
F
)
(F (p˜− pF )− f (p˜− pF )) (40b)
Note that f(·) should be interpreted here as the probability mass function. We analyze next the
different points satisfying the optimality conditions (39):
a) pF =0
(39c)→ γ = 0
(39a)→
∂z˜+
∂pF
− γ ≥ 0 =⇒
∂z˜+
∂pF
≥ 0 =⇒ F (p˜)≤
cF − c
−
F
c+F − c
−
F
b) 0< pF < pF
(39b)→ γ =0
(39c)→ γ = 0
(39a)→
cF − c
−
F
c+F − c
−
F
≤ F (p˜− pF )≤
cF − c
−
F
c+F − c
−
F
+ f (p˜− pF )
c) pF = pF
(39b)→ γ = 0
(39a)→
∂z˜−
∂pF
+ γ ≤ 0 =⇒ cF − c
−
F −
(
c+F − c
−
F
)
(F (p˜− pF )− f (p˜− pF ))+ γ ≤ 0 =⇒
=⇒ F (p˜− pF )≥
cF − c
−
F
c+F − c
−
F
Since F−1 (·) is the generalized inverse distribution function, and l1 is defined as F
−1
(
cF−c
−
F
c
+
F
−c
−
F
)
,
the dispatch rule for a discrete probability distribution of the uncertain supply coincides with (35).
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Using Proposition 4, the proof of Theorem 1 proceeds as follows:
Proof. This proof deals with the optimal dispatch of an inflexible power unit with capacity
pI > 0 and marginal cost cI and the flexible-stochastic generation portfolio of Proposition 4. For
a total system load denoted by l, this optimal dispatch is determined by solving the following
optimization problem:
Minimize
pI≥0,p˜≥0
z = cIpI +
∫ p˜
0
c˜ (x)dx (41a)
pI + p˜= l : τ (41b)
pI ≤ pI : φ (41c)
Since the integral of an increasing function is a convex function, problem (41) is a convex
optimization problem and therefore, the KKT conditions below are necessary and sufficient for
optimality.
0≤ (cI − τ +φ)⊥ pI ≥ 0 (42a)
0≤ (c˜(p˜)− τ)⊥ p˜≥ 0 (42b)
0≤ (pI − pI)⊥ φ≥ 0 (42c)
pI + p˜= l (42d)
The solution to problem (41) is then obtained by exhaustively examining the points that satisfy
the optimality conditions (42) as follows:
a) pI =0 and p˜= 0
(42d)→ only feasible if l= 0
(42c)→ φ= 0
(42a)→ τ ≤ cI
(42b)→ τ ≤ c˜(0)
b) pI =0 and p˜ > 0
(42d)→ p˜= l
(42c)→ φ= 0
(42a)→ τ = c˜(p˜)
(42b)→ τ ≤ cI
}
c˜(p˜)≤ cI
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c) pI = pI and p˜= 0
(42d)→ pI = l
(42c)→ φ≥ 0
(42a)→ τ ≥ cI
(42b)→ τ ≤ c˜(0)
}
cI ≤ τ ≤ c˜(0)
d) pI = pI and p˜ > 0
(42d)→ p˜= l− pI
(42c)→ φ≥ 0
(42a)→ τ ≥ cI
(42b)→ τ = c˜(p˜)
}
cI ≤ c˜(p˜)
e) 0< pI <pI and p˜= 0
(42d)→ pI = l
(42c)→ φ= 0
(42a)→ τ = cI
(42b)→ τ ≤ c˜(0)
}
cI ≤ c˜(0)
f) 0<pI < pI and p˜ > 0
(42d)→ pI + p˜= l
(42c)→ φ= 0
(42a)→ τ = cI
(42b)→ τ = c˜(p˜)
}
cI = c˜(p˜)
Let pˆ denote the value of p˜ such that c˜ (pˆ) = cI . Note that the function c˜(p˜) is increasing and
continuous on p˜ and therefore, pˆ exists provided that c˜(0) ≤ cI ≤ c˜(∞). If cI < c˜(0), then we set
pˆ=0. Similarly, if cI > c˜(∞), we assign the value ∞ to pˆ. This way the solutions obtained in cases
a)–f) above can be summarized in the following dispatch rule:
p˜=

l if 0≤ l≤ pˆ
pˆ if pˆ≤ l≤ pˆ+ pI
l− pI if pˆ+ pI ≤ l
(43)
where the dispatch of the inflexible power capacity is pI = l − p˜. Note that the function c˜(p˜) is
piecewise and therefore, pˆ can take on the following values
pˆ=

0 if cI ≤ c˜(0)
l2 if c˜(0)≤ cI ≤ c˜(l1)
l3 if c˜(l1)≤ cI ≤ c˜(l1+ pF )
l4 if c˜(l1+ pF )≤ cI ≤ c˜(∞)
∞ if c˜(∞)≤ cI
(44)
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where
l2 := l :
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
+
FF (l) = cI
l3 := l :
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )− c
−
F (1−F (l)) = cI − cF
l4 := l :
(
v− c−F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
−
FF (l) = cI
Merging (35), (43) and (44) we obtain the following cases:
Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. 0 l 0
cI ≤ c˜(0)
0≤ l≤ pI
2. l− pI pI 0 pI ≤ l≤ l1+ pI
3. l1 pI l− l1− pI l1 + pI ≤ l≤ l1 + pI + pF
4. l− pI − pF pI pF l1 + pI + pF ≤ l
5. l 0 0
c˜(0)≤ cI ≤ c˜(l1)
0≤ l≤ l2
6. l2 l− l2 0 l2 ≤ l≤ l2 + pI
7. l− pI pI 0 l2 + pI ≤ l≤ l1 + pI
8. l1 pI l− l1− pI l1 + pI ≤ l≤ l1 + pI + pF
9. l− pI − pF pI pF l1 + pI + pF ≤ l
10. l 0 0
c˜(l1)≤ cI ≤ c˜(l1 + pF )
0≤ l≤ l1
11. l1 0 l− l1 l1 ≤ l≤ l3
12. l1 l− l3 l3− l1 l3 ≤ l≤ l3 + pI
13. l1 pI l− l1− pI l3 + pI ≤ l≤ l1 + pF + pI
14. l− pI − pF pI pF l1 + pF + pI ≤ l
15. l 0 0
c˜(l1+ pF )≤ cI ≤ c˜(∞)
0≤ l≤ l1
16. l1 0 l− l1 l1 ≤ l≤ l1 + pF
17. l− pF 0 pF l1 + pF ≤ l≤ l4
18. l4− pF l− l4 pF l4 ≤ l≤ l4 + pI
19. l− pI − pF pI pF l4 + pI ≤ l
20. l 0 0
c˜(∞)≤ cI
0≤ l≤ l1
21. l1 0 l− l1 l1 ≤ l≤ l1 + pF
22. l− pF 0 pF l1 + pF ≤ l
Next the different dispatch rules above are recast as a function of the system characteristics
constants l1, l2, l3, l4 only. To do so, we note that if l2, l3, l4 do not exit, their values are assigned to
infinity.
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Rules 1-4 only apply if the marginal cost of the stochastic-flexible portfolio for p˜= 0 is higher
than the marginal cost of the inflexible power unit cI . Note also that the condition cI ≤ c˜(l1) is
equivalent to l1 ≥ l2 and thus we can jointly reformulate rules 1-9 as follows:
pW pI pF applies if
l 0 0
l1 ≥ l2
0≤ l≤ l2
l2 l− l2 0 l2 < l≤ pI + l2
l− pI pI 0 pI + l2 < l≤ pI + l1
l1 pI l− l1− pI pI + l1 < l≤ pF + pI + l1
l− pF − pI pI pF l > pF + pI + l1
Rules 10,15 and 20 can be easily merged as
pW pI pF applies if
l 0 0 l1 < l2 0≤ l≤ l1
The condition c˜(l1)≤ cI ≤ c˜(l1+ pF ) can be equivalently formulated as l1 < l2 and l3 ≤ l1 + pF ,
which allows expressing rules 11-14 as:
pW pI pF applies if
l1 0 l− l1
l1 < l2 l3 ≤ l1+ pF
l1 ≤ l≤ l3
l1 l− l3 l3− l1 l3 < l≤ pI + l3
l1 pI l− l1− pI l3+ pI < l≤ pI + pF + l1
l− pI − pF pI pF l > pI + pF + l1
Rules 16 and 21 can also be merged as:
pW pI pF applies if
l1 0 l− l1 l1 < l2 l3 > l1+ pF l1 ≤ l≤ pF + l1
Likewise, rules 17-19 and 22 can be rewritten as:
pW pI pF applies if
l− pF 0 pF
l1 < l2 l3 > l1+ pF
∃l4
(cI ≤ v)
pF + l1 ≤ l≤ l4
l4− pF l− l4 pF l4 ≤ l≤ l4 + pI
l− pF − pI pI pF l > l4+ pI
l− pF 0 pF ∄l4 l > pF + l1
The final dispatch rule can be thus summarized as:
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Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0
l1 ≥ l2
0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 < l≤ pI + l2
3. l− pI pI 0 pI + l2 < l≤ pI + l1
4. l1 pI l− l1− pI pI + l1 < l≤ pF + pI + l1
5. l− pF − pI pI pF l > pF + pI + l1
6. l 0 0
l1 < l2
0≤ l≤ l1
7. l1 0 l− l1
l3 ≤ l1 + pF
l1 ≤ l≤ l3
8. l1 l− l3 l3− l1 l3 < l≤ pI + l3
9. l1 pI l− l1− pI l3+ pI < l≤ pI + pF + l1
10. l− pI − pF pI pF l > pI + pF + l1
11. l1 0 l− l1
l3 > l1 + pF
l1 ≤ l≤ pF + l1
12. l− pF 0 pF
∃l4
(cI ≤ v)
pF + l1 ≤ l≤ l4
13. l4− pF l− l4 pF l4 ≤ l≤ l4+ pI
14. l− pF − pI pI pF l > l4 + pI
15. l− pF 0 pF ∄l4 l > pF + l1

Remark 3 (Discrete probability distribution). The same sub-differential analysis used in
Proposition 4 can be applied here so that the dispatch rule above is also valid for the case in which
the uncertain power supply is modeled by a discrete probability distribution. In such a case, it
suffices to redefine the constants l2, l3, l4 as:
l2 :=min
l≥0
l :
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
+
FF (l)≥ cI
l3 :=min
l≥l1
l : cF +
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )− c
−
F (1−F (l))≥ cI
l4 := min
l≥l1+pF
l :
(
v− c−F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
−
FF (l)≥ cI
Appendix C: Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. First, we show that, under the conditions stated in this corollary, l3 ≤ l1+pF , and there-
fore, rules 11–15 of the stochastic dispatch solution do not apply. For this purpose, consider expres-
sion (10), which defines constant l3, and note that cF +
(
v− c+F
)
F (pF − pF ) − c
−
F (1−F (pF )) =
cF + (v− c
+
F )F (0), because F (pF ) = 1 given that pF ≥ pW . Furthermore, it holds that cF + (v−
c+F )F (0)> cI , since cF > cI and (v− c
+
F )F (0)≥ 0. Consequently, we have that l3 ≤ pF ≤ l1+ pF .
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Now we prove that l3 =max (l1,A) with A = F
−1
(
1− cF−cI
c
−
F
)
is optimal for the minimization
problem (10). By construction, l3 ≤ pW . Note that cF +
(
v− c+F
)
F (A− pF )− c
−
F (1−F (A))− cI =(
v− c+F
)
F (A− pF ) ≥ 0 and that F (x) = 0 for all x < 0. Hence, either l3 = A if A ≥ l1 or l3 = l1
otherwise.
We can proceed analogously to show that l2 = F
−1
(
cI
c+
F
)
. Let denote constant F−1
(
cI
c+
F
)
by B. By
construction 0≤B ≤ pW . Consider minimization problem (9). It holds that
(
v− c+F
)
F (B− pF )+
c+FF (B) − cI =
(
v− c+F
)
F (B− pF ) ≥ 0. Since B − pF ≤ 0 and F (x) = 0 for all x < 0, l2 = B is
optimal for (9).
Finally, the result corresponding to l ≤ pI trivially follows by isolating those ranges of system
load for which l must be lower than pI . 
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let us start identifying the optimal solution to the forward dispatch model (12) for a
given value of the virtual bid volume pV . The merit-order dispatch of the inflexible, flexible and
stochastic power capacity is provided in the table below. Note that the case l > p̂W + pV + pI + pF
makes problem (12) infeasible.
case pF pI pW λ
f applies if
a) 0 0 l− pV 0 l < p̂W + pV
b) 0 0 p̂W [0, cI ] l= p̂W + pV
c) 0 l− p̂W − pV p̂W cI p̂W + pV < l < p̂W + pV + pI
d) 0 pI p̂W [cI , cF ] l= p̂W + pV + pI
e) l− p̂W − pV − pI pI p̂W cF p̂W + pV + pI < l < p̂W + pV + pI + pF
f) pF pI p̂W [cF ,∞] l= p̂W + pV + pI + pF
Observe that in cases a), b) or c), the flexible generation technology is not dispatched and
therefore, the balancing market-clearing problem (13) simplifies to:
Minimize
p
+
F
(ω),∆pW (ω),s(ω)
c+Fp
+
F (ω)+ vs(ω) (45a)
s.t. p+F (ω)+∆pW (ω)+ s(ω)+∆pV (ω) = 0 : λ
b(ω) (45b)
0≤ p+F (ω)≤ pF (45c)
0≤ pW +∆pW (ω)≤W (ω) (45d)
0≤ s(ω)≤ l (45e)
whose solution boils down to a merit-order-based dispatch, that is,
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p+F (ω) p
−
F (ω) ∆pW (ω) s(ω) λ
b(ω) applies if
0 0 pV 0 0 pW + pV <W (ω)
0 0 pV 0 [0, c
+
F ] W (ω)= pW + pV
pW + pV −W (ω) 0 W (ω)− pW 0 c
+
F pW + pV − pF <W (ω)<pW + pV
pW + pV −W (ω) 0 W (ω)− pW 0 [c
+
F , v] W (ω)= pW + pV − pF
pF 0 W (ω)− pW pW + pV −W (ω)− pF v W (ω)<pW + pV − pF
The expected balancing price for these cases is computed as:∫
Ω
λb(ω)f(ω)dω=
∫ pW+pV −pF
0
vf(ω)dω+
∫ pW+pV
pW+pV −pF
c+Ff(ω)dω= vF (pW + pV − pF )+
+ c+F (F (pW + pV )−F (pW + pV − pF )) =
(
v− c+F
)
F (pW + pV − pF )+ c
+
FF (pW + pV )
In cases d), e) and f) of the forward dispatch, pW = p̂W and therefore, the balancing market-
clearing problem (13) becomes:
Minimize
p
+
F
(ω),p−
F
(ω),∆pW (ω),s(ω)
c+Fp
+
F (ω)− c
−
Fp
−
F (ω)+ vs(ω) (46a)
s.t. p+F (ω)− p
−
F (ω)+∆pW (ω)+ s(ω)+∆pV (ω) = 0 : λ
b(ω) (46b)
0≤ p−F (ω)≤ pF (46c)
0≤ p+F (ω)≤ pF − pF (46d)
0≤ p̂W +∆pW (ω)≤W (ω) (46e)
0≤ s(ω)≤ l (46f)
whose solution is given by:
p+F (ω) p
−
F (ω) ∆pW (ω) s(ω) λ
b(ω) applies if
0 l− pI − p̂W − pV l− pI − p̂W 0 0 l− pI <W (ω)
0 l− pI − p̂W − pV l− pI − p̂W 0 [0, c
−
F ] W (ω) = l− pI
0 W (ω)− p̂W − pV W (ω)− p̂W 0 c
−
F p̂W + pV <W (ω)< l− pI
0 0 pV 0 [c
−
F , c
+
F ] W (ω) = p̂W + pV
p̂W + pV −W (ω) 0 W (ω)− p̂W 0 c
+
F l− pI − pF <W (ω)< p̂W + pV
p̂W + pV − l+ pI + pF 0 l− pI − pF − p̂W 0 [c
+
F , v] W (ω) = l− pI − pF
pF − l+ p̂W + pV + pI 0 W (ω)− p̂W l− pF − pI −W (ω) v W (ω)< l− pI − pF
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Hence, the expected balancing price in cases d), e) and f) is calculated as:∫
Ω
λb(ω)f(ω)dω=
∫ l−pI−pF
0
vf(ω)dω+
∫ p̂W+pV
l−pI−pF
c+Ff(ω)dω+
∫ l−pI
p̂W+pV
c−F f(ω)dω+
∫ ∞
l−pI
0f(ω)dω=
= vF (l− pI − pF )+ c
+
F (F (p̂W + pV )−F (l− pI − pF ))+ c
−
F (F (l− pI)−F (p̂W + pV )) =
=
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pI − pF )+
(
c+F − c
−
F
)
F (p̂W + pV )+ c
−
FF (l− pI)
Finally, the KKT conditions of the arbitrager’s problem (14) imply that:
∂
∂pV
(
λfpV − pV
∫
Ω
λb(ω)f(ω)dω
)
= 0 =⇒ λf =
∫
Ω
λb(ω)f(ω)dω (47)
That is, the strategy of the arbitrager is to place a zero-price virtual bid pV in the forward
market and to repurchase or resell the same amount in the balancing market so that the forward
price equals the expected balancing price.
The solution to the short-run equilibrium problem must be a point that is simultaneously optimal
for the arbitrager’s problem and the clearing problems of the forward and the balancing markets.
Therefore, in the short-run equilibrium solution the forward price λf must be equal to the expected
balancing price
∫
Ω
λb(ω)f(ω)dω, which we denote by λb. Below we analyze the solution to the
short-run equilibrium problem for each of the cases a) to f) included in the first table of this proof.
a)
λf = 0
λb = (v− c+F )F (l− pF )+ c
+
FF (l)
}
l= 0
b)
0≤ λf ≤ cI
λb =
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
+
FF (l)
}
0≤ l≤ l2
c)
λf = cI
λb =
(
v− c+F
)
F (p̂W + pV − pF )+ c
+
FF (p̂W + pV )
}
p̂W + pV = l2
p̂W + pV < l < p̂W + pV + pI
 l2 < l < l2+ pI
d)
cI ≤ λ
f ≤ cF
λb =
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pI − pF )+ c
+
FF (l− pI)
}
l2 ≤ l− pI ≤ l5
e)
λf = cF
λb =
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pI − pF )+
(
c+F − c
−
F
)
F (p̂W + pV )+ c
−
FF (l− pI)
}
=⇒
=⇒ F (p̂W + pV ) =
cF −
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pI − pF )− c
−
FF (l− pI)
c+F − c
−
F
p̂W + pV + pI < l≤ p̂W + pV + pI + pF =⇒
=⇒ l− pI − pF ≤ p̂W + pV ≤ l− pI =⇒
=⇒ F (l− pI − pF )<F (p̂W + pV )≤F (l− pI)

l5 < l− pI < l6
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f)
cF ≤ λ
f
λb =
(
v− c−F
)
F (l− pI − pF )+ c
−
FF (l− pI)
}
l− pI ≥ l6
where
l2 :=min
l≥0
l :
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
+
FF (l)≥ cI
l5 :=min
l≥0
l :
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF − pI)+ c
+
FF (l− pI)≥ cF
l6 :=min
l≥0
l :
(
v− c−F
)
F (l− pF − pI)+ c
−
FF (l− pI)≥ cF
Note that l5 and l6 are defined using minimization problems to account for both continuous and
discrete probability distributions for the uncertain power supply. Therefore, the dispatch rule can
be summarized as:
Rule # pW + pV pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0 0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 < l≤ l2+ pI
3. l− pI pI 0 l2+ pI < l≤ l5
4. l7(l) pI l− l7(l)− pI l5 < l≤ l6
5. l− pF − pI pI pF l6 < l
where
l7(l) := F
−1
(
cF −
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pI − pF )− c
−
FF (l− pI)
c+F − c
−
F
)

Appendix E: Proof of Corollary 5
Proof. The proof of point 1 follows directly from the comparison of the closed-form dispatch
solutions provided in Theorems 1 and 2: For l1 ≥ l2 and 0≤ l≤min (pI + l1, l5), dispatch rules 1–3
in these two theorems apply and provide exactly the same solution (pW , pF , pI).
Statement 2 is a consequence of the fact that if pF > pW , then l2 = F
−1
(
cI
c
+
F
)
(see Corollary 4),
and thus,
cF−c
−
F
c
+
F
−c
−
F
≥ cI
c
+
F
implies that l1 ≥ l2. Furthermore, if pF > pW , it holds that pI+ l1 < l5, because
substituting pI + l1 into (16) gives
(
v− c+F
)
F (l1− pF ) + c
+
FF (l1) = c
+
F
cF−c
−
F
c
+
F
−c
−
F
≤ cF , since c
+
F ≥ cF .
From this point on, the proof of statement 2 proceeds as that of point 1.
Claim 3 is based on Corollary 2. Indeed, the dispatch rule provided by this corollary is the same
as that given by Theorem 2 when l /∈ (l5, pW + pI + pF ). Furthermore, note that l6 ≤ pI + pF + pW ,
since substituting l= pI + pF + pW into (17) yields
(
v− c−F
)
F (pI + pF + pW − pF − pI)+ c
−
FF (pI +
pF + pW − pI) =
(
v− c−F
)
F (pW )+ c
−
FF (pF + pW ) = v > cF .
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Claim 4 stems from claim 3 by just noticing that l5 = pW + pI when c
+
F = cF and pF > pW .
Statement 5 trivially follows from the fact that the dispatch solution provided by Theorem 2
is one of the possible solutions that the stochastic dispatch rule admits when cF = c
+
F = c
−
F (see
Corollary 3).
Finally, the last claim relies on the fact that if cF = c
−
F , maximum cost-efficiency is always
achieved by breaking the merit order (see Corollary 1) except for l≥ l4+ pI when l3 >pF , and l≥
pF + pI otherwise. Recall that the price-consistent conventional two-stage market always prompts
dispatch solutions that respect the merit order. 
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We divide the forward dispatch solutions that are feasible for model (21) into two groups.
The first group includes those solutions in which the inflexible generation is dispatched below
its capacity (pI < pI). The solutions of the second group are characterized by the fact that the
inflexible power generation technology is dispatched to its maximum capacity (pI = pI).
If pI < pI and provided that cI < cF , the dispatch of the flexible generation pF has to be equal to 0
to comply with the optimality condition of the lower-level problem (21h)–(21k). Or, in other words,
the merit-order forward dispatch imposed through (21h)–(21k) implies that the more expensive
flexible generation is only dispatched if the cheaper inflexible generation has reached its maximum
capacity. For pF = 0, pI = l−pW and using the expected balancing cost of Proposition 2, the bilevel
problem (21) reduces to the following single-level optimization problem:
Minimize
pW≥0
cI (l− pW )+ v
∫ pW−pF
0
F (ω)dω+ c+F
∫ pW
pW−pF
F (ω)dω (48a)
s.t. pW ≤ l (48b)
Based on the KKT conditions of this convex optimization problem, the dispatch rule and system
marginal expected cost in this case is given by:
pW pI pF Marginal expected cost applies if
l 0 0 (v− c+F )F (l− pF )+ c
+
FF (l) 0≤ l≤ l2
l2 l− l2 0 cI l2 ≤ l≤ l2 + pI
Finally, the total expected cost corresponding to solutions with pI < pI , which we denote by
z1(l), is computed as:
z1(l) =
∫ min(l,l2)
0
A(s)ds+ cImax(l− l2,0) (49)
where A(s) = (v− c+F )F (s− pF )+ c
+
FF (s).
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On the other hand, the second group of feasible solutions are characterized by the fact that the
inflexible generation technology is dispatched at full capacity, i.e., pI = pI . The dispatch rule of the
flexible and stochastic generation can be thus derived from Proposition 2 with p˜= l− pI , that is,
pW pI pF Marginal cost applies if
l− pI pI 0 (v− c
+
F )F (l− pF )+ c
+
FF (l) pI ≤ l≤ l1+ pI
l1 pI l− l1− pI cF +
(
v− c+F
)
F (l− pF )− c
−
F (1−F (l)) l1 + pI ≤ l≤ l1 + pI + pF
l− pI − pF pI pF
(
v− c−F
)
F (l− pF )+ c
−
FF (l) l1 + pI + pF ≤ l
Consequently, the total expected cost in this second case, which we denote by z2(l), is given by:
z2(l) = cIpI +
∫ min(l−pI ,l1)
0
A(s)ds+
∫ min(l−pI ,l1+pF )
min(l−pI ,l1)
B(s)ds+
∫ l−pI
min(l−pI ,l1+pF )
C(s)ds (50)
where B(s) = cF +
(
v− c+F
)
F (s− pF )− c
−
F (1−F (s)) and C(s) =
(
v− c−F
)
F (s− pF )+ c
−
FF (s).
Note that if l ≤ pI , the optimal forward dispatch must necessarily belong to the first group of
feasible solutions and the total expected cost is, therefore, equal to z1(l). Likewise, if l ≥ l2 + pI ,
the optimal dispatch requires pI = pI and hence, the total expected cost is given by z
2(l). For
load levels pI ≤ l≤ l2+ pI we must, however, compare z
1(l) against z2(l) to determine whether it
is optimal to dispatch the inflexible generation at its maximum capacity or not. To conduct this
comparison, we distinguish between two cases, namely, l2 ≤ l1 and l1 < l2.
If l2 ≤ l1, and given that pI ≤ l≤ l2+ pI , then l− pI ≤ l1 and therefore:
z2(l) = cIpI +
∫ l−pI
0
A(s)ds (51)
Without any further assumption, we can rewrite z1(l) as:
z1(l) = cI max(l− l2,0)+
∫ l−pI
0
A(s)ds+
∫ min(l,l2)
l−pI
A(s)ds (52)
Therefore, for pI ≤ l≤ l2+ pI and l2 ≤ l1, we have:
z2(l)− z1(l) = cI (pI −max(l− l2,0))−
∫ min(l,l2)
l−pI
A(s)ds (53)
Next we evaluate the function z2(l)− z1(l) at the extremes of the interval pI ≤ l ≤ l2 + pI and
also compute its derivative with respect to l and obtain the following results:
z2(pI)− z
1(pI) =
{
cIl2−
∫ l2
0
A(s)ds≥ 0 if l2 ≤ pI
cIpI −
∫ pI
0
A(s)ds≥ 0 if pI < l2
(54)
z2(l2+ pI)− z
1(l2+ pI) = 0 (55)
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∂ (z2(l)− z1(l))
∂l
=
{
−cI +A(l− pI)≤ 0 if l2 ≤ l
−A(l)+A(l− pI)≤ 0 if l < l2
(56)
where we have used that A(s)≤ cI for s≤ l2 by definition, and that A(s) is an increasing function.
Hence, we can conclude that z1(l)≤ z2(l) for pI ≤ l ≤ l2 + pI and provide the following dispatch
rule for l2 ≤ l1:
pW pI pF applies if
l 0 0 0≤ l≤ l2
l2 l− l2 0 l2 ≤ l≤ l2+ pI
l− pI pI 0 l2+ pI ≤ l≤ l1 + pI
l1 pI l− pI − l1 l1+ pI ≤ l≤ l1 + pI + pF
l− pI − pF pI pF l1+ pI + pF ≤ l
Let us now analyze the case l1 < l2 for pI ≤ l≤ l2+ pI . First we rewrite z
1(l) as:
z1(l) = cI max(l− l2,0)+
∫ min(l−pI ,l1)
0
A(s)ds+
∫ min(l−pI ,l1+pF )
min(l−pI ,l1)
A(s)ds+
∫ l−pI
min(l−pI ,l1+pF )
A(s)ds+
+
∫ min(l,l2)
l−pI
A(s)ds (57)
And therefore:
z2(l)− z1(l) = cI (pI −max(l− l2,0))−
∫ min(l−pI ,l1+pF )
min(l−pI ,l1)
(A(s)−B(s))ds−
−
∫ l−pI
min(l−pI ,l1+pF )
(A(s)−C(s))ds−
∫ min(l,l2)
l−pI
A(s)ds (58)
By evaluating z2(l)− z1(l) at pI , l2+ pI and l1+ pI we obtain:
z2(pI)− z
1(pI) =
{
cIl2−
∫ l2
0
A(s)ds≥ 0 if l2 ≤ pI
cIpI −
∫ pI
0
A(s)ds≥ 0 if pI < l2
(59)
z2(l2+ pI)− z
1(l2+ pI) =−
∫ min(l2,l1+pF )
l1
(A(s)−B(s))ds−
∫ l2
min(l2,l1+pF )
(A(s)−C(s))ds≤ 0 (60)
z2(l1+ pI)− z
1(l1+ pI) =
{
cIpI −
∫ l1+pI
l1
A(s)ds≥ 0 if l1+ pI ≤ l2
cI (l2− l1)−
∫ l2
l1
A(s)ds≥ 0 if l2 < l1+ pI
(61)
where we have used that A(s) ≥ B(s),∀s≥ l1, that A(s) ≥ C(s),∀s, and that A(s) ≤ cI ,∀s ≤ l2.
After checking that
∂(z2(l)−z1(l))
∂l
≤ 0 for pI ≤ l ≤ l2 + pI , we can conclude that there must exist
at least one OR THERE MUST EXIST A UNIQUE?? l8 such that l1 + pI ≤ l8 ≤ l2 + pI and
z2(l8)− z
1(l8) = 0. Therefore, the dispatch rule if l1 < l2 is:
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pW pI pF applies if
l 0 0 0≤ l≤min(l2, l8)
l2 l− l2 0 l2 ≤ l≤ l8
l1 pI l− pI − l1 l8 ≤ l≤ l1+ pI + pF
l− pI − pF pI pF max(l8, l1+ pI + pF )≤ l
where
l8 := x : l1+ pI ≤ x≤ l2+ pI and cI (pI −max(x− l2,0))−
∫ min(x−pI ,l1+pF )
min(x−pI ,l1)
(A(s)−B(s))ds−
−
∫ x−pI
min(x−pI ,l1+pF )
(A(s)−C(s))ds−
∫ min(x,l2)
x−pI
A(s)ds= 0 (62)
Consequently, the optimal dispatch rule prompted by the bilevel linear program (21) can be
formulated as follows:
Rule # pW pI pF applies if
1. l 0 0 0≤ l≤ l2
2. l2 l− l2 0 l2 ≤ l≤ l2+ pI
3. l− pI pI 0 l2 ≤ l1 l2 + pI ≤ l≤ l1 + pI
4. l1 pI l− pI − l1 l1 + pI ≤ l≤ l1 + pI + pF
5. l− pI − pF pI pF l1 + pI + pF ≤ l
6. l 0 0
l1 < l2
0≤ l≤min(l2, l8)
7. l2 l− l2 0 l2 ≤ l≤ l8
8. l1 pI l− pI − l1 l8 ≤ l≤ l1+ pI + pF
9. l− pI − pF pI pF max(l8, l1+ pI + pF )≤ l

Appendix G: Proof of Corollary 6
Proof. Statement 1 is trivially inferred by comparing the tables provided in Theorems 1 and 3:
rules 1–5 in both theorems are identical. These rules apply for l1 ≥ l2.
Statement 2 follows from the fact that any stochastic dispatch solution that satisfies the merit
order complies, by definition, with the following two conditions simultaneously: i) it is an optimal
solution to the lower-level problem (21h)–(21k), because it respects the merit order and ii) it
minimizes the expected system operating cost (21a), because it is a solution given by the stochastic
dispatch rule.
Morales and Pineda: On the Inefficiency of the Merit Order in Forward Markets with Uncertain Supply
50 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!)
Statement 3 simply highlights a particular case that is already covered by statement 2, since any
dispatch solution for which pI = pI preserves the merit order (recall that cI < cF ).
Finally, statement 4 can be inferred from Corollary 3 and by noticing that, if cF = c
+
F = c
−
F , then
l8 = l2+ pI . 
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